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CHINA’S AMENDED CONSTITUTION: QUEST 
FOR LIBERTY AND INDEPENDENT JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 
M. ULRIC KILLION* 
ABSTRACT 
Whether China’s model of judicial review will evolve into a more 
discursive, independent model is a pressing issue in international law and 
politics. This issue has gained even greater prominence after China’s 
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Rule of law, and its 
attendant judicial review, facilitates economic growth because it affords 
stability, transparency, and fairness to the entire economy. The directional 
growth and development of Chinese constitutionalism has national, 
interregional, and international implications that affect the growth and 
prosperity of both China and the world’s economy. 
On March 14th, 2004, China amended its 1982 Constitution. Past 
amendments to the 1982 Constitution had mostly addressed economic 
reform. Conversely, the March 14, 2004 amendments to the 1982 
Constitution addressed liberty and human rights, including property rights. 
These new amendments inadvertently provide a gauge for measuring the 
“constitutionalism” of China’s 1982 Constitution against modern 
constitutions.1 For instance, the constitutionalism of the 1982 Constitution 
may be assessed by whether, under its current constitutional regime, China 
can give efficacy to a constitutional amendment that supposedly 
safeguards human rights and rights over private property. Forces that 
influence China’s constitutionalism include China’s ontological base in 
tradition (Confucianism), political ideology, constitutional history, and 
constitutional and governmental structure. The newest amendments also 
incorporate the ideology of Jiang Zemin’s “Theory of the Three 
Represents” into the preamble as an additional guiding ideology. These 
circumstances illustrate how Chinese political ideology and culture affect 
 * B.S. (Econ.), J.D. (Doctor of Law), Visiting Professor of International Law, Shanghai 
International Studies University (PRC).  
 1. “Constitutionalism” is defined as “Government in which power is distributed and limited by 
a system of laws that must be obeyed by the rulers.” WEBSTER’S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 242 
(3d ed. 2001). For the purposes of this Article, China’s relative “constitutionalism” is the degree to 
which power is distributed and limited by a system of laws that must be obeyed by the rulers. 
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constitutionalism, the safeguarding of liberty, and the development of a 
positive and discursive model of judicial review. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Is Chinese ziyou (liberty), “[S]omething we do, not something I do?”2 
 
The People’s Republic of China (China) was formed in 1949,3 and in 
1954 adopted its first constitution.4 Constitutional government in China 
originally began in the aftermath of the Sino-British Opium Wars (1839–
1842 and 1856–1860)5 as a result of China’s realization that it needed to 
modernize in order to defend itself against Western invading powers.6  
 2. J.S. MCCLELLAND, A HISTORY OF WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 265 (1996). 
 3. Cent. Intel. Agency, China, in The World Factbook, at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/ 
factbook/geos/ch.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2004). 
 4. ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA [PRC CONST.] (1954). 
 5. For a thorough account of the Opium Wars and their impact on China’s constitution, see 
WILLIAM TRAVIS HANES & FRANK SANELLO, THE OPIUM WARS: THE ADDICTION OF ONE EMPIRE 
AND THE CORRUPTION OF ANOTHER (2002). 
 6. Suiseheng Zhao, Chinese Nationalism and Its International Orientations, 115 POL. SCI. Q. 1, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss1/3
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Constant strife plagued the historical periods of China’s transition from 
the pre-modern period (jindai) (1840), through the modern period 
(xiandai) (1911), to the contemporary period (dangdai) (1949).7 This is 
equally true in terms of China’s development of constitutionalism. 
Moreover, China’s transition from the pre-modern to the contemporary 
period corresponds with its transition to constitutional government. 
Generally, early constitutional modernization occurred during the 
following periods: from the 1860s to 1880s; during the 1890s; and from 
1895 to 1911.8  
Historically, China’s constitutional government has experienced a 
seemingly endless succession of constitutions, revisions, and amendments. 
The 1982 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (Zhonghua 
renmin gongheguo xianfa) (1982 Constitution)9 was amended in 1988, 
1993 and 1999.10 In comparison, the March 14, 2004 amendments (2004 
Amendments) covered thirteen articles, including the preamble.11 
This raises the issue of whether Chinese political ideology and culture 
have been the primary forces in creating these successive constitutions and 
amendments. Party ideology may take over or supplant a constitution or, 
similarly, a constitution may emerge that affirms or demands compliance 
to party ideology.12 Modern Chinese constitutionalism is shrouded and 
obscured by the ideology of the governing Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP). Indeed, there is an inherent danger that the CCP will write its 
entire ideology into the constitution. 
Another pressing issue is how the CCP’s ideological and cultural 
influences affect the development of a discursive model of judicial review. 
“[C]onstitutions are value-oriented documents . . . and [societal] values 
and the political culture of a given society, play important roles in the 
formulation and application of all constitutions.”13 
2 (2000). 
 7. Neil Renwick & Cao Qing, China’s Political Discourse Towards The 21st Century: 
‘Victimhood’, Identity and Political Power 21 n.1, at http://www.psa.ac.uk/cps/1999/renwick.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2004). 
 8. JIANG JINSONG, THE NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS OF CHINA 18–19 (2002). 
 9. ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA [PRC CONST.] (1982) [hereinafter 1982 
CONSTITUTION]. 
 10. Constitution to be Amended a Fourth Time, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 3, 2004, at 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-03/03/content_311346.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2004) 
[hereinafter Constitution to be Amended Fourth Time]. 
 11. ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA [PRC CONST.] (2004) [hereinafter 2004 
AMENDMENTS]. 
 12. Suna Kili, Problems of the Application of Contemporary Constitutions, in MODERN 
CONSTITUTION 117, 131–32 (Thomas Fleiner-Gerster ed., 1988). 
 13. Id. at 118. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The 2004 Amendments addressed human rights, private property, and 
the incorporation of Jiang Zemin’s “Theory of the Three Represents” 
(“Three Represents”).14 But in terms of gauging the development of 
independent judicial review, it is the fourth amendment that is important. 
The 1982 Constitution stands apart from earlier constitutions because it 
focused primarily on economic reform. In contrast, the newly adopted 
fourth amendment, while adopting official party ideology and the “Three 
Represents,” also addresses an issue unrelated to economic reform:15 
China’s attempt to safeguard liberty through normative, as opposed to 
semantic, constitutional government. As manifested in the 1982 
Constitution, CCP ideology expressed in the “Three Represents” conflicts 
with the conceptions of liberty expressed by the concepts of human rights 
and private property.16 In terms of the Hegelian dialectic (thesis, antithesis, 
and synthesis), the conflict between CCP ideology and liberty should be 
resolved through synthesis, through sublimation and self-improvement, 
and through becoming a more Western-oriented model of constitutional 
government.17 However, this result shall never be realized, because it 
ignores the fact that the Chinese concept of liberty (ziyou) is defined in 
terms of socialist democracy.18 
Another issue is the role of judicial review in the development of 
Chinese constitutionalism. The issue is two-part. First, it is uncertain 
whether Chinese constitutionalism can safeguard liberty without 
independent judicial review or some other form of constitutional review, 
for instance, a constitutional court.19 Second, assuming China’s present 
form of constitutional government fails to safeguard liberty, the prospects 
of China’s judiciary developing a positive, discursive model of judicial 
review that will safeguard liberty also remain unclear. 
In general, Chinese constitutional provisions that address liberty 
provide only conceptual rights because the government’s structure lacks 
both popular sovereignty and a genuine separation of powers, and because 
 14. Human Rights, Private Property Fixed as Pillars, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 23, 2003, at 
http://www1.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-12/23/content_292557.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2004) 
[hereinafter Human Rights, Private Property Fixed as Pillars]. 
 15. 2004 AMENDMENTS, supra note 11. 
 16. Id. arts. 10, 13, 15. 
 17. For an explanation of Hegel’s theory of history and the dialectic, see for example, J. 
BRONOWSKI & BRUCE MAZLISH, THE WESTERN INTELLECTUAL TRADITION FROM LEONARDO TO 
HEGEL 481–90 (1975). 
 18. See infra Part IV.B. 
 19. Susan Newman, Comparing Courts, 2001 WASH. U. INST. GLOB. LEG. STUD. 8, at 
http://law.wustl.edu/Geninfo/Magazine/Sp2002/03_comparing_courts.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2004). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss1/3
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the judiciary lacks the power of independent judicial review.20 
Unfortunately, given the current state of Chinese constitutionalism, a 
conceptual right of liberty cannot be safeguarded by mere constitutional 
provisions, and the development of a positive, discursive model of 
independent judicial review is, arguably, improbable and 
unconstitutional.21 
A tangential issue is whether the 2004 Amendments truly manifest 
liberty, rather than just social rights. If they only manifest social rights, 
then the analysis necessarily becomes whether China’s constitutional 
structure possesses the ability to safeguard social rights, instead of liberty, 
in terms of a normative-semantic dichotomy.22 Assuming China’s 
judiciary lacks the power of independent judicial review, the determinative 
issue is whether the Chinese model of constitutional government, 
influenced by democratic centralism and socialist democracy, represents a 
normative, rather than a merely semantic, constitutionalism.23  
That China’s constitutional government lacks popular sovereignty, 
separation of powers, and independent judicial review presents a problem. 
Many factors may be relied upon as illustrations, including: U.S. 
condemnations of China’s human rights record at the U.N. Human Rights 
Commission (UNHRC),24 China’s accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO),25 global inter-legality, and other external forces. 
Notwithstanding its evolution toward a more Western taxonomy (Western 
constitutionalism), China’s model of constitutional government still lacks 
the institutional capacity to comprehend Western notions of liberty and the 
capability to safeguard either liberty or social rights. 
Few disagree that Marxist-Leninism is a foregone conclusion.26 
Twenty-five years ago, China began initiating legal reform, economic 
 20. See, e.g., M. Ulric Killion, Quest For Legal Safeguards for Foreign Exporters Under China’s 
Anti-Dumping Regime, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 417, 454 (2004) (discussing weaknesses in 
China’s constitutional and governmental structure). 
 21. Id. 
 22. KILI, supra note 12, at 125. 
 23. Id. 
 24. EU Sends Human Rights Warning to China, EUR. REP., Mar. 25, 2000, 2000 WL 8841237. 
 25. See Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/l/432, (Nov. 10, 2001), 
available at http://unpan.1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN002123.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 14, 2004) [hereinafter Protocol on Accession]. The Protocol on Accession was 
accepted by the Government of the People’s Republic of China on November 11, 2001, and came into 
effect on December 11, 2001. Id. See also Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiotions 33 I.L.M.1144 
(1994), reprinted in THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL 
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 4 (1999). 
 26. Barbara Foley, From Situational Dialectics to Pseudo-Dialectics: Mao, Jiang, and Capitalist 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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development, and an open door policy. And since then, the Chinese 
economy has presented itself as a socialist-political polity with a capitalist-
economic policy. One source predicted, 
Given continuing peace and stability, China will ultimately realize 
its major economic development objectives, certainly by the first 
quarter of the 21st century, if not by 2015. By then China will 
clearly be a middle-income economy in terms of its per-capita 
income but its total GDP will make it the world’s largest 
economy.27 
In terms of legal and economic reform, a potential problem for China is 
that the “engines that have driven China’s growth in the past are losing 
their dynamism.”28 For China, continuing economic development and 
prosperity29 depend upon a continued growth and evolution of Chinese 
constitutionalism, rule of law, and, in particular, independent judicial 
review. “[T]he way in which the modern formal legal order that evolved in 
some Western countries was transplanted into other countries is a much 
more important determinant of legality and economic development today 
than the supply of a particular legal code.”30 
This Article addresses the aforementioned issues by reviewing the 
historicity of Chinese constitutionalism, and the forces of ideology and 
culture that influence social values. These forces include: China’s 
ontological base in tradition (Confucianism); its relevant laws; decisions, 
replies, and resolutions of the Supreme People’s Court and the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress (SCNPC); and the political 
and constitutional relationship of the SCNPC to the National People’s 
Congress (NPC). A review of the resolutions, decisions, and powers of the 
SCNPC is especially important because the 1982 Constitution grants to the 
Transition, 5 CULTURAL LOGIC (2002), at http://eserver.org/clogic/2002/ Foley.html (last visited Oct. 
15, 2004) (describing the consensus). 
 27. John Wong, China’s Post-Deng Xiaoping Economy: Problems and Prospects, International 
University of Japan Research Institute, Working paper No. 1 (1997), at http://www.iuj.ac.jp/research/ 
wpap001.cfm (last visited Sept. 28, 2004). 
 28. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, CHINA IN THE WORLD 
ECONOMY: THE DOMESTIC POLICY CHALLENGES 10 (2002). 
 29. See 8% GDP Growth Forecast for 2004, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 6, 2003, available at 
http://www1.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-11/06/content_278919.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2004) 
[hereinafter 8% GDP Growth Forecast for 2004]. 
 30. Katherine Pistor et al., Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect (1999), at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=183269 (last visited Nov. 14, 2004). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss1/3
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SCNPC, and not to the Supreme People’s Court, the power to interpret the 
Constitution and laws of China (lifa jieshi quanli).31 
II. HISTORICITY OF CHINA CONSTITUTIONS 
A. Sino-British Post-Opium Wars Constitutions 
China’s turn toward representative democracy dates to the period 
between 1860 and 1911.32 The transition from dynastic government to 
constitutional government is divided into three periods: from the 1860s to 
the 1880s; the 1890s; and from 1895 to 1911.33 These periods parallel the 
end of dynastic China (the end of Qing Dynasty (Qing Chao) (1636–
1911)),34 and the aftermath of the Opium Wars (1839–1842 and 1856–
1860), respectively.35 
Following the Opium Wars, China had to redefine itself in terms of 
Western conceptions of sovereignty and nationalism. At the turn of the 
nineteenth century, sovereignty and nationalism were defined in terms of 
Western international law and politics.36 Despite controversies concerning 
the origin of international law, a problem for China at the turn of the 
nineteenth century was that “the international legal system [was] a white 
man’s club, to which non-European states would be admitted only if they 
produced evidence that they were ‘civilized.’”37 
China after the Opium Wars was described as being in a state of 
transition from a traditional culture to a political entity.38 These changes 
were intended to restore Chinese power. Indeed, “[t]he determination to 
restore China’s national grandeur is the crux of Chinese nationalism.”39 
China’s defeat in the first Opium War catalyzed the borrowing of a 
European notion of nationalism.40 This European nationalism was fueled 
 31. 1982 CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, arts. 67(1), 67(4). See also infra Part V.B. 
 32. JIANG, supra note 8, at 18. 
 33. Id. at 18–19. 
 34. See J.A.G. ROBERTS, A CONCISE HISTORY OF CHINA (1999). The Qing Dynasty followed the 
Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) and preceded the Republic of China (ROC) (1911–1949). Id. at 118–255. 
 35. HANES, supra note 5, at 3. 
 36. See infra Part III. 
 37. PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 8–10 
(7th rev. ed. (1997)). 
 38. See, e.g., HANES & SANELLO, supra note 5, at 10–14 (describing the post-Opium War 
transition). 
 39. JOHN W. GARVER, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 20 (1993), 
quoted in Zhao, supra note 6, at 4. 
 40. Zhao, supra note 6, at 4. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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by the flames of xenophobia, and fostered by proto-nationalism.41 The 
combined forces of modernization caused a shift from dynastic to 
constitutional government, eventually culminating in the fall of the Qing 
dynasty in 1911.42 
The first period of transition toward constitutional government is 
attributed to Chinese officials introducing “Western style politics” to 
China.43 The second period, the 1890s, is attributed to the emergence of an 
entrepreneurial class that urged a constitutional monarchy.44 And the third 
period is attributed to “revolutionaries of the business class who turned 
away from a constitutional monarchy pursuing instead a democratic 
republic.”45 
The introduction of Western constitutionalism in China is couched in 
several themes, including Western parliament, political parties, elections, 
comparative Western constitutional models, and the relationship between a 
constitution and power.46 Of these, the most important theme has been the 
comparison of Western constitutional models. In considering differing 
constitutional models, the models of Britain and Germany, rather than 
those of the United States, France, or Japan, were deemed to have “most 
nearly achieved the golden mean.”47 
During the first period of transition, proponents of modernization 
generally ascribed the prosperity and power of Western parliaments to 
their constitutional governments, especially parliamentary government.48 
However, neither Western constitutional government nor parliamentary 
government truly took root in post-Qing China. The problem may have 
been tradition which, along with the Paris Peace Conference of 1918,49 
 41. ROBERTS, supra note 34, at 197. 
 42. JIANG, supra note 8, at 18–19. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 19. Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, and Yan Fu were pioneers of this stage. They were 
“intellectuals educated in feudal tradition,” who later became “advocates for a constitutional 
monarchy.” Id. 
 45. Id. “The most influential leaders of the third stage were Sun Yatsen, Song Jiaoren and Huang 
Xing.” Id. 
 46. Id. at 19–20. 
 47. Id. at 20. See also Cushi Ying Fa Yi Bi Si Guo Riji, Juan Sen, Guang Xu Chao, Shiliu nian Qi 
Yue Ersher Riji (TRAVELING DIARY OF FOUR COUNTRIES: ENGLAND, FRANCE, ITALY, AND BELGIUM) 
197 (1985). 
 48. JIANG, supra note 8, at 20. 
 49. ZHAOWU HE et al., AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF CHINA 548 (Zhaowu He trans.) (1991). 
The 1918 Peace Conference, at the end of World War I, was dominated by Western powers and 
“flagrantly delivered the former German privileges in China to Japan . . . On May 4, 1919, students in 
Beijing “rose in a patriotic demonstration to which people all over the country, especially the young 
intellectuals, responded vehemently. Thus began the May Fourth Movement.” Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss1/3
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were sources of support for the continuing influence of the Qing dynasty,50 
as witnessed by the May Fourth Movement.51 During this turbulent period, 
China had difficulty assimilating into itself the institutions associated with 
Western constitutionalism (democracy and liberty) because the underlying 
theories of democracy and liberty, espoused by such Enlightenment 
thinkers as John Locke and Jacque Rousseau—”that government was held 
in trust instead of by ordained right and that the monarch was a mere agent 
of society with ‘no will, no power but that of law’—were conceptions 
‘alien’ in the traditional Chinese social structure of hierarchical 
relationships and patriarchal values” and the Chinese vestiture of authority 
not in the people, but in the state.52 
The traditional vestiture of authority in the state contributed to China’s 
transition to communism, the 1921 birth of the CCP, and the CCP’s views 
on constitutional theory and practice.53 A society in which monarchy was 
considered part of the “natural” political order,54 poses a strong barrier to 
Western constitutionalism and parliamentary government. Those seeking 
to modernize (to Westernize) China at the turn of the nineteenth century 
faced “the strongest tradition of absolute monarchy and the scantiest belief 
in representative government.”55 This series of events led China to become 
a communist state and to select democratic centralism, rather than 
separation of powers, as an underlying principle of governance.56 
Moreover, during this period, communist leaders considered parliamentary 
government to be both infeasible and a tool of the capitalist.57 
In the past century, China has had twelve constitutions,58 eight of 
which were enacted between 1908 and 1954.59 And following the 1949 
 50. S.A.M. ADSHEAD, CHINA IN WORLD HISTORY 386 (3d ed. 2000). 
 51. VERA SCHWARCZ, THE CHINESE ENLIGHTENMENT: INTELLECTUALS AND THE LEGACY OF 
THE MAY FOURTH MOVEMENT OF 1919 12–27 (1990). 
 52. Lawrence R. Sullivan, Intellectual and Political Controversies Over Authority in China: 
1898–1922 21, at http://www2.eastwestcenter.org/education/culauthasia/olc/papers/p_Sullivan.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 28, 2004). 
 53. JIANG, supra note 8, at 38–39. 
 54. Sullivan, supra note 52, at 21. 
 55. JIANG, supra note 8, at 38. 
 56. Id. at 40. 
 57. Id. at 38–39 (quoting ZHOU ENLAI TONG YIZHAN XIAN WEN XUAN (SELECTED WORKS OF ZHOU 
ENLAI UNITED FRONT) 141 (1984), and citing MAO ZEDONG XUANJI (SELECTED WORKS OF MAO 
ZEDONG) 628–29 (1966)). 
 58. Hong Shihong, No Difference Whether Constitutional or Not—The Conflict Between the 
System of Democratic Centralization and Constitutional Review and its Solution, ADVANCES IN 
SOCIAL SCIENCE 2002, at http://notesweb.uni-wh.de/wg/wiwi/wgwiwi.nsf/vwFiles/ 
scc_constitutionalreview/$FILE/constitutional+review.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2004). 
 59. Id. at l n.2 (citing WILLIAM L. TUNG, THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF MODERN CHINA 318–
79 (1964)). 
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founding of the People’s Republic of China, four more constitutions were 
enacted (in 1954, 1975, 1978, and 1982, respectively).60 
Of the pre-Mao (pre-1949) constitutions, the 1923 and 1946 
constitutions were viewed positively by legal scholars. This praise, 
however, is limited in consequence: the 1923 Constitution was never fully 
implemented because the promulgating government was immediately 
overthrown; and the 1946 Constitution expressed its strengths only in 
Taiwan, rather than in China.61 
In 1954, the first plenary session of the First Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference adopted the Common Programme of the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference, which served as a temporary 
constitution.62 In September 1954, following the establishment of the 
Congress, China’s first constitution was adopted.63 In 1975, the second 
constitution was adopted but was poorly drafted because it was 
promulgated during the ninth year of the Cultural Revolution (Wenhua Da 
Geming) (1966–1976).64 This 1975 Constitution is a legacy of the chaos 
ensuing from the Cultural Revolution. In 1978, when attempting to 
recover from the chaos of Cultural Revolution, China adopted its third 
constitution. This constitution is described by one source as being “ultra-
leftist”65 because it incorporated the political rhetoric associated with the 
Cultural Revolution.66 
Conversely, the 1982 Constitution, supposedly antithetical to the 
Cultural Revolution’s relative constitutionalism, expunges the political 
rhetoric that had been incorporated in the 1978 Constitution.67 The 1982 
Constitution contains no references to the Cultural Revolution;68 however, 
the 1982 Constitution restates Mao Zedong’s contributions in accordance 
with a major historical reassessment produced in June 1981 at the Sixth 
Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee, the “Resolution on Some 
Historical Issues of the Party since the Founding of the People’s Republic” 
 60. China in Brief, Political System and State Structure, CHINA INTERNET INFORMATION 
CENTER, at http://www1.china.org.cn/e-china/politicalsystem/constitution.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 
2004). 
 61. ANDREW J. NATHAN, CHINA’S TRANSITION 73 (1997). 
 62. Constitution to be Amended a Fourth Time, supra note 10. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Balance Between Consistency, Adaptability, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 30, 2003, available at 
http://www1.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-10/30/content_276763.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2004) 
[hereinafter Balance Between Consistency]. 
 66. CHINA: A COUNTRY STUDY 422 (Robert L. Worden et al. eds., 4th ed. 1988). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
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(“Resolutions on Some Historical Issues”).69 Deng Xiaoping made the 
following recommendation regarding the drafting of the Resolution on 
Some Historical Issues: 
In drafting the “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of 
Our Party Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China,” 
we should seek truth from facts and conscientiously draw lessons 
from the “Left” mistakes. As regards the anti-Rightist struggle of 
1957, I have said more than once that there really were some 
persons then who made vicious attacks, but that we for our part 
over-reacted and unduly broadened the scope of the struggle. Of 
course, it cannot be said that all those who were criticized were 
completely correct, or that they had made no mistakes. We should 
sum up historical experience and draw the necessary lessons in 
accordance with the principle of seeking truth from facts.70  
The theme of the Cultural Revolution went from dominant at the 
CCP’s Ninth National Congress, to disastrous at the Sixth Plenary Session 
of the Eleventh National Congress, and was absent during discussions at 
the Fifteenth National Congress.71 However, some party ideologies 
survived the onslaught of the Resolutions on Some Historical Issues. 
The 1982 Constitution has Chinese characteristics and is “well suited 
for the betterment of the nation politically, economically and culturally 
during the new era of socialist modernization.”72 Moreover, the 1982 
Constitution supposedly uses the 1954 model as a framework.73 One 
source describes the constitution as “a workable set of institutions [capable 
of] moving China toward democracy: a series of four levels of people’s 
congresses from the local to national level exercising popular 
sovereignty.”74 
For a long time China has had difficulty defining the concept of social 
democracy.75 This creates a quandary, because liberty or social rights 
 69. Id. 
 70. Deng Xiaoping, On Opposing Wrong Ideological Tendencies (Mar. 27, 1981), in SELECTED 
WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING 356, 357 (Cent. Comm. of the Communist Party of China ed., 1983) 
[hereinafter SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING]. 
 71. Id. See also Renwick, supra note 7, at 22 (discussing 1980 speech). 
 72. AsianInfo.org, Chinese Politics 2000, at http://www.asianinfo.org/asianinfo/china/ 
politics.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2004). 
 73. Balance Between Consistency, supra note 65. 
 74. NATHAN, supra note 61, at 73. 
 75. Barrett L. McCormick, Political Change in China and Vietnam: Coping with Consequences 
of Economic Reform, in TRANSFORMING ASIAN SOCIALISM § 153.166 (Anita Chan et al. eds., 1999) 
(providing a defense of social democracy). 
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must, in China, be definable in terms of socialist democracy, not just in 
terms of traditional Western democracy. An earlier reform movement 
resulted in China’s version of parliamentary government, the NPC,76 and 
legislative supremacy.77 The local elections may also have been intended 
to replicate Western parliamentary elections.78 However, when one gauges 
how well the Chinese constitutional government safeguards liberty, one 
witnesses “old tactics in new conditions.”79 Socialist democracy is neither 
a reflection of Western liberal democracy, nor of a British style of Western 
parliamentary supremacy.80 The 1982 Constitution and socialist 
democracy are merely vestiges of Marxist-Leninism and Mao Zedong’s 
socialism.81 
B. Political Economy of the 1982 Constitution 
In 1978, an ideological debate occurred between pragmatism and 
Mao’s orthodox version of Marxist-Leninism.82 In 1978, at the Third 
Plenary Session of the Eleventh Party Central Committee, “Deng 
Xiaoping established his position at the core of the second-generation 
leadership of the CCP.”83 Afterward, in 1992, Deng Xiaoping visited 
Shenzhen in Guangdong Province and officially declared, “China would 
adopt a ‘socialist market economy,’” thereby commencing 
modernization.84 Core aspects of Deng Xiaoping’s policy included 
economic development, maintaining political stability, and the ideology of 
the Four Cardinal Principles (Si Xiang Jiben Yuanze).85 
In 1992, in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square tragedy, the Fifth 
Session of the Fifth NPC affirmed Deng Xiaoping’s Four Cardinal 
Principles,86 and China instituted a socialist market economy (shehuizhuyi 
 76. Id. at 166. 
 77. 1982 CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, arts. 57–58. 
 78. See generally Zhonghua renmin gongheguo cunmin weiyuanhui zuzhi fa (Organic Law of the 
Villagers Committees of the People’s Republic of China), NPC, Nov. 4, 1998, 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/dispecontent.asp?ID=988&DB=1 (last visited Sept. 3, 2004). 
 79. McCormick, supra note 75, at 165–66. 
 80. Lord Irvine of Lairg, Sovereignty in Comparative Perspective: Constitutionalism in Britain 
and America, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 16 (2001). 
 81. McCormick, supra note 75, at 166. 
 82. Yingyi Qian, The Process of China’s Market Transition (1978–98): The Evolutionary, 
Historical, and Comparative Perspectives, 156 J. INST. & THEOR. ECON. 151, 153 (2000), available at 
http://www-econ.stanford.edu/faculty/workp/swp99012.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2004). 
 83. Wang Yanzhong, Chinese Values, Governance, and International Relations: Historical 
Development and Present Situation, in CHANGING VALUES IN ASIA 13, 29 (Han Sung-Joo ed., 1999). 
 84. ROBERTS, supra note 34, at 299.  
 85. Wang, supra note 83, at 29. 
 86. See ROBERTS, supra note 34, at 298–99 (discussing the government’s actions after the 
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shichang jingji), which signaled the end of price controls and encouraged 
development of private enterprise.87 The NPC added the words, “develop a 
socialist market economy” to the Preamble of the 1982 Constitution, 
thereby granting these words constitutional status.88 Many hailed the 
amendment as a formula for the social ills facing the country that, if 
implemented at the time, could have avoided the tragedy of June 4, 1989.89  
On November 16, 2003, there was a changing of the guard, and 
China’s new leadership, in ranking order, became: Hu Jintao, Wu 
Bangguo, Wen Jiabao, Jia Qinglin, Zeng Qinghong, Huang Ju, Wu 
Guanzheng, Li Changchun, and Luo Gan.90 It was of primary concern to 
the new leadership, as they headed toward the January and March 2003 
elections of the Tenth NPC,91 to avoid the power struggle that led to the 
Tiananmen Movement.92 This concern evidences a transition in ideology 
and, arguably, a new culture93 that gives priority to socio-economic rights 
over civil-political rights.94 
Earlier post-1949 constitutions and the original and un-amended 1982 
Constitution strongly contrast with the post-1992 version of the 1982 
Constitution and its prescriptions for modernization and economic reform. 
From 1949 to 1989, there existed a more dynamic relationship between the 
International Bill of Rights95 and those rights afforded by these 
constitutions.96 However, despite Western constitutional language, civil 
rights that would conform to international norms were rendered nugatory 
tragedy). 
 87. Id. at 299. 
 88. ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA [PRC CONST.] pmbl. (1999) [hereinafter 1999 
AMENDMENTS]. 
 89. ROBERTS, supra note 34, at 298–99 (discussing what possible mitigating effects earlier 
economic reform may have had). 
 90. Francesco Sisci, Hu Steps up but Jiang Stays on Top, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, Nov. 16, 2002, at 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/DK16Ad03.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2004). 
 91. China Internet Information Center, National People’s Congress: Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference, Mar. 9, 2002, at http://www.china.org.cn/english/archiveen/28406.htm (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2004). 
 92. Sisci, supra note 90. 
 93. SHI HU, ZHONGGUO DE WENYI FUXING (THE CHINESE RENAISSSANCE) (Paragon Book 
Reprint Corp. 1963) (1934) 501. As an outgrowth of the May Fourth Movement, “beginning in 1915, a 
strong intellectual movement was well under way, known as the New Culture Movement.” Id. 
 94. Alice Erh-Soon Tay, ‘Asian Values’ and the Rule of Law, § III(8) (2000), available at 
http://dex1.tsd.unifi.it/jg/en/index.htm?surveys/rol/tay.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2004). 
 95. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 6.A.Res.217A. (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d. Sess., at 71 
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), available at http://www.1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/bl1udr.htm (last visited 
Sept. 28, 2004). 
 96. Ann Kent, Waiting for Rights: China’s Human Rights and China’s Constitutions, 1949–
1989, 13 HUM. RTS. Q. 170, 199 (1991). 
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by constitutionally prescribed duties, acts of legislation, and the CCP.97 
Since the Tiananmen Square tragedy of 1989, the United States (except 
for 2003) has annually presented to the UN Human Rights Commission 
(UNHRC) a resolution in which it condemns China’s human rights 
record.98 The U.S. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices of China 
routinely find that, “[t]he Constitution and laws provide for fundamental 
human rights; however, these protections often are ignored in practice.”99 
In terms of post-Mao constitutions, it has been the dominance of the CCP 
that has undermined the democratic potential of China’s constitutions.100 
The 1982 Constitution has been amended four times. The first 
amendment was enacted during the First Session of the Seventh NPC on 
April 12, 1988.101 It comprised of two articles—the first addressed the 
private sector of the economy and the second prohibited the unlawful 
activities in the use and transfer of land.102 On March 29, 1993, the 1982 
Constitution was amended a second time at the First Session of the Eighth 
NPC.103 The amendments modified articles 3–11, most of which addressed 
economic issues.104 On March 15, 1999, the Constitution was amended by 
adding articles 12–17, which also primarily addressed economic issues.105  
The NPC amended the constitution for a fourth time on March 14, 
2004.106 The amendments generally addressed the protection of human 
rights and private property, and the incorporation of Jiang Zemin’s “The 
Theory of the Three Represents” (San Ge Daibiao) into the Preamble.107 
China’s amendments address economic reform generally; however, the 
fourth amendment includes general provisions addressing human rights in 
article 33(3) and a rule addressing compensation in cases of property 
 97. Id. 
 98. See EU Sends Human Rights Warning to China, supra note 24. 
 99. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2000, S. REP. NO. 107-32, at 737–38 (1st 
Sess. 2001). See also Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2002, S. REP. NO. 108-30, at 
749 (1st Sess. 2003) (describing China’s worsening human rights record). 
 100. NATHAN, supra note 61, at 73. 
 101. ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA [PRC CONST.] (1988) [hereinafter 1988 
AMENDMENTS]. 
 102. Id. arts. 1–2. 
 103. ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA [PRC CONST.] (1993) [hereinafter 1993 
AMENDMENTS]. 
 104. Id. arts. 3–11. 
 105. 1999 AMENDMENTS, supra note 88, arts 14–17. 
 106. 2004 Amendments, supra note 11. See also Constitutional Progress, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 22, 
2004, at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-03/22/content_316835.htm (last visited Sept. 
28, 2004). 
 107. Human Rights, Private Property Fixed as Pillars, supra note 14. See also 2004 
AMENDMENTS, supra note 11. 
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expropriation in articles 10(3) and 13(3).108 Amendments are especially 
noteworthy in terms of Chinese political ideology, if not culture, because 
“the draft amendment also incorporates the theory of [the] ‘Three 
Represents’ into the Constitution’s Preamble as one of the guiding 
principles for the nation, together with the heritage and further 
development of Marxism, Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng 
Xiaoping Theory.”109  
In terms of ideology and culture, the earlier 1999 Amendments are 
equally noteworthy. Article 13 is a prescription for the rule of law, and 
adds the following words to article 5: “The People’s Republic of China 
governs the country according to law and makes it a socialist country ruled 
by law (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shixing yifa zhiguo, jianshe 
shehuizhuyi fazhi guojia).”110 In addition, there is an amendment to the 
preamble, which adds Deng Xiaoping’s theory111 and the phrase, “develop 
a socialist market economy (fazhan shehuizhuyi shichang jingji).”112 The 
inclusion of these words bestowed constitutional import upon both the 
theory and the words, thereby granting credence to one of Deng 
Xiaoping’s Four Cardinal Principles (Si Xiang Jiben Yuanze), which is, 
“[t]o ensure people’s democracy, we must strengthen our legal system.”113 
 108. 2004 AMENDMENTS, supra note 11. The fourth amendment made the following changes: “. . . 
along the road of building socialism with Chinese characteristics . . . and . . . under the guidance of 
Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory . . .” was changed to “ . . . along 
the road of Chinese-style socialism . . . and . . . under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong 
Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thought of ‘Three Represents’ . . .” Id. 
 And “The State may, in the public interest, requisition land for its use in accordance with the law” 
was changed to “The State may, in the public interest and in accordance with the provisions of law, 
expropriate or requisition land for its use and shall make compensation for the land expropriated or 
requisitioned.” Id. art. 10, para. 3. 
 The clauses, “The State protects the right of citizens to own lawfully earned income, savings, 
houses and other lawful property,” and, “The State protects according to law the right of citizens to 
inherit private property,” were changed to, “[c]itizens’ lawful private property is inviolable,” and, “The 
State, in accordance with law, protects the rights of citizens to private property and to its inheritance,” 
and, “The State may, in the public interest and in accordance with law, expropriate or requisition 
private property for its use and shall make compensation for the private property expropriated or 
requisitioned.” Id. art. 13, para. 6. The phrase, “[t]he State respects and preserves human rights,” was 
also added. Id. art. 33 para. 8. 
 109. Human Rights, Private Property Fixed as Pillars, supra note 14. 
 110. 1999 AMENDMENTS, supra note 88, art. 13. 
 111. See Deng Xiaoping, Uphold the Four Cardinal Principles (Mar. 30, 1979), in SELECTED 
WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING, supra note 70, at 191. 
 112. 1999 AMENDMENTS, supra note 88, art. 12. 
 113. Deng Xiaoping, Emancipate the Mind, Seek Truth from Facts and Unite as One in Looking to 
the Future (Dec. 13, 1978), in SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING, supra note 70, at 151, 157. 
Deng Xiaiping explained further that, “the procuratorial and judicial organs should be strengthened. 
All this will ensure that there are laws to go by, that they are observed and strictly enforced, and that 
violators are brought to book.” Id. at 158. 
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Notwithstanding internal and external wars, militarism, political 
culture, underdevelopment, poverty, flaws in constitutional design, and 
other forces, ideology has been a primary force in causing Chinese 
democracy to fail.114 Due to the fact that Chinese institutions are value-
laden and possess Confucian characteristics,115 culture may be the only 
force that equals, if not surpasses, the force of ideology in China. In this 
respect, the predominance of Confucianism is represented in all traditional 
schools of Chinese philosophical thought.116 Although they differ, “the 
major Asian religions and philosophies. . . share similar concepts about the 
origins and purpose of power.”117 Ideology and culture will influence the 
growth and direction of Chinese constitutionalism, rule of law, and 
judicial review because “[e]conomic transition is part of the transition in 
constitutional rules” and its “[s]peed and the time path of the transition are 
determined by its driving mechanism.”118 Constitutionalism reflects legal 
reform and economic development, as well as the forces of ideology and 
culture. 
III. WESTERN JUDICIAL REVIEW AND LIBERTY 
A. History of Western Judicial Review 
Western universalism, especially in terms of U.S. constitutionalism, 
evolves around interrelated legal concepts of popular sovereignty, 
separation of powers, and independent judicial review. Rule of law is 
important for independent judicial review because independent judicial 
review evolves from the rule of law and exhibits characteristics distinctive 
of Western legal norms and history.  
Many hail the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Marbury vs. 
Madison119 as establishing the “leading precedent” of independent judicial 
review.120 However, the notion itself actually predates Chief Justice 
 114. NATHAN, supra note 61, at 63. 
 115. CH’IEN MU, TRADITIONAL GOVERNMENT IN IMPERIAL CHINA 121 (Chu-tu Hsueh & George 
O. Totten trans., 1982). 
 116. David A. Funk, Traditional Chinese Jurisprudence: Justifying Li and Fa, 17 S.U.L. REV. 1, 
45–46 (1990). Chinese schools of philosophical thought include, among others, Confucianism, Neo-
Confucianism, Legalism, Taoism, the Ying Yang School, Logicism, and Buddhism. Id. at 4. 
 117. KATHARINA PISTOR & PHILIP A. WELLONS, THE ROLE OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN 
ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1960–1995 33 (1998). 
 118. Jeffrey Sachs et al., Economic Reforms and Constitutional Transition, at 15 (Oct. 2000), at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=254110 (last visited Oct. 20, 2004). 
 119. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 120. CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF LAW 
47 (1996) (discussing the role of Marbury v. Madison in the evolution of independent judicial review). 
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Marshall’s 1803 decision.121 
It was employed by the parlements of the Ancien Régime to justify 
their refusal to record acts contrary to the basic laws of the 
kingdom. Abbé Sieyés also invoked it, declaring in 1795 that either 
the constitution is binding or it is a nullity. The same idea was later 
proposed by Carré de Malberg, establishing a link between the 
possibility of review on the one hand and the separation of 
constituent and constituted powers on the other.122 
Notwithstanding the contributions of Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) to 
modern philosophy with his materialist philosophy of the seventeenth 
century,123 including the evolution of his rationality of absolute power into 
democratic power-sharing,124 it was Baron de Montesquieu (1689–1755) 
who introduced the concept of separation of the powers of government.125 
However, just as the notion of judicial review preceded Marshall’s 
pronouncement in Marbury v. Madison, others, like Machiavelli, preceded 
Montesquieu. One source finds that Machiavelli “anticipated Montesquieu 
in his enthusiasm for a mixed government.”126 In his Discourses, 
Machiavelli wrote, “In fact, when there is combined under the same 
constitution a prince, nobility, and the power of the people, then these 
three powers will watch and keep each other reciprocally in check.”127  
In terms of Anglo-American jurisprudence, legal evolution in 
England128 resulted in a divergence between the American notion of 
constitutional supremacy and England’s doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty.129 In England, the principle of The Case of the College 
Physicians (Dr. Bonham’s Case)130 fell into disfavor, but flourished in the 
 121. Id. at 55; Michel Troper, The Logic of Justification of Judicial Review, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L.  
99, 103 (2003), available at http://www3.oup.co.uk/ijclaw/hdb/Volume_01/Issue_01/pdf/010099.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 28, 2004). 
 122. Id. (footnotes omitted). See also RAYMOND CARRE DE MALBERG, LA LOI, EXPRESSION DE 
LA VOLONTÉ GÉNÉRALE [LAW, AN EXPRESSION OF THE GENERAL WILL] 126 (Economica eds., 1984) 
(1931). 
 123. BRONOWSKI, supra note 17, at 196–97. 
 124. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 85 (Michael Oakeshot ed., Oxford 1946) (1651). 
 125. See CHARLES LOUIS DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF LAWS (David 
Wallace Carrithers ed., Univ. of Cal. Press 1977) (1748) (discussing Montesquieu’s conception of 
separation of powers). 
 126. BRONOWSKI & MAZLISH, supra note 17, at 41. 
 127. NICCOLÓ MACHIAVELLI, THE DISCOURSES OF NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI (Dr. W. Clark ed., 
Leslie J. Walker trans., Routledge & Kegan Paul 1950) (1513–21). 
 128. Irvine, supra note 80, at 12. 
 129. See id. at 3 (describing the difference between constitutional and parliamentary supremacy). 
 130. The Case of the College Physician, 8 Co. Rep. 107a, 114a (C.P. 1610), reprinted in 5 THE 
FOUNDER’S CONSTITUTION 303 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) [hereinafter Dr. 
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American colonies.131 In Dr. Bonham’s Case, the famous words of Lord 
Coke read: 
And it appears in our books, that in many cases the common law 
will controul acts of parliament and sometimes adjudge them to be 
utterly void: for when an act of parliament is against common right 
and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the 
common law will controul it and adjudge such act to be void.132 
The Western concept of rule of law eventually established itself as the 
dominant legal system in America, and culminated in the landmark 
decision of Marbury vs. Madison.133 
Western jurisprudence, especially in the United States, stems from 
several origins: the Enlightenment thinkers,134 Dr. Bonham’s Case,135 and 
Marbury vs. Madison.136 An important distinguishing feature of Western 
jurisprudence is that it emanates from philosophical ideals, fear of 
oppressive government, and the need to limit the exercise of popular 
democracy.137 
B. The Dilemma of Rousseau’s Liberty 
Notwithstanding the contributions of John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, and 
other Enlightenment thinkers, it is perhaps the thematic discourses of Jean-
Jacques Rousseau in The Social Contract that best demonstrate the 
potency of the Enlightenment and its concept of liberty.138 
Contrary to Rousseau’s intention, his concept of liberty has been 
interpreted as a positive concept of liberty, rather than a negative one.139 
Positive liberty has been distinguished from negative liberty in that: 
Bonham’s Case] (all subsequent references will be cited to page numbers within THE FOUNDER’S 
CONSTITUTION). 
 131. Theodore F. T. Plucknett, Bonham’s Case and Judicial Review, 40 HARV. L. REV. 30, 34, 
61–68 (1926–27). 
 132. Id. at 34 (quoting Dr. Bonham’s Case, supra note 129, at 303). 
 133. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. at 137. 
 134. See supra notes 123–26 and accompanying text. 
 135. Dr. Bonham’s Case, supra note 130; see generally Plucknett, supra note 131, at 30 
(discussing the cases place in the origin of independent judicial review). 
 136. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. at 137. 
 137. Id. 
 138. JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Hilail Gilden ed., The University of 
Chicago Press 1983) (1762). 
 139. MCCLELLAND, supra note 2, at 264. 
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Negative liberty is what we mean in ordinary speech by liberty—
that is, absence of restraint: I am free to the extent that there are no 
external hindrances to my pursuit of my own self-chosen ends. 
These external hindrances can be physical or legal, moral or 
religious. This is an “end of the day” kind of liberty: you look 
around the world and you judge yourself free to the extent that 
physical, legal, moral or religious obstacles prevent you from doing 
what you happen to want to do. This view of liberty, which we have 
already called “Individualist”, frankly accepts that liberty will in 
fact be restricted: living in a world with other men guarantees that. 
Law, the positively enacted laws of a state, will itself be negative in 
this view of things.140 
Positive liberty “is a ‘beginning of the day’ kind of liberty because it 
would actually tell you what to do.”141 “Positive liberty consists of the 
pursuit of behaviour laid down by a self-chosen rational principle.”142 
In terms of constitutionalism, Rousseau’s concept of the General Will, 
perhaps inadvertently, serves as a measure of constitutionalism because of 
the constraints of positive and negative liberty. While negative liberty is 
deeply personal, positive liberty “is more easily attainable in a group than 
individually.”143 In terms of positive liberty, freedom (or its pursuit) 
“becomes a collective venture, something we do, not something I do.”144 
Strikingly, the resulting interpretations and fate of Rousseau’s Social 
Contract resemble the fate of Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan. As previously 
mentioned, Hobbes provides a modern foundation for Western 
jurisprudence by asserting the rationality of absolute power, which, also 
inadvertently, evolved into the seemingly dissimilar idea of a separation of 
power.145 
Rousseau’s ideas caused negative liberty to become one of—as 
opposed to the exclusive-means by which liberty could be conceived. In 
terms of the modern debates concerning totalitarianism, the issues can be 
expressed in two ways: First, has modern society evolved into a state 
requiring an election between negative (individual) liberty and positive 
(collective) liberty? Second, how much negative (individual) liberty must 
 140. Id. at 264–65; see also ISIAH BERLIN, TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY: AN INAUGURAL 
LECTURE DELIVERED BEFORE THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD ON 31 OCTOBER 1958 7–16 (1958). 
 141. MCCLELLAND, supra note 2, at 264. 
 142. Id. at 265; see also Berlin, supra note 140, at 16–19. 
 143. MCCLELLAND, supra note 2, at 265. 
 144. Id. 
 145. HOBBES, supra note 124, at 85. 
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be surrendered in the pursuit of positive (collective) goals?146  
The negative-positive liberty dichotomy provides a measurement for 
gauging constitutional institutions, especially in terms of Western 
constitutionalism. Thus, a constitution may be measured in terms of 
promoting and safeguarding negative liberty, rather than positive liberty.  
IV. CHINESE JURISPRUDENCE AND RULE OF LAW (FAZHI)  
A. Confucianism and Legalism 
Rule of law “is neither a rule nor a law”; instead, “it is now generally 
understood as a doctrine of political morality which concentrates on the 
role of law in securing the correct balance of rights and powers between 
individuals and the state in free and civilised societies.”147 The correct 
balance is definable in terms of Western taxonomies: law may be defined 
in terms of either rule by man or rule by law; law may be either policy-
driven or instrumental; and law may employ thin or thick theories of the 
rule of law.148 Western authority employs the latter in each pairing to 
gauge China’s progress in adopting a Western style of rule of law as 
opposed to a Sinic-centered, or culture-specific rule of law.149 
Any genuine consideration of constitutionalism, rule of law, and 
judicial review must consider China’s historical particularities. A 
constitution’s efficacy is contingent upon it having constitutional 
provisions that reflect “not only sound political theory but also the values 
and historical experiences of the people whom the constitution will 
govern.”150 It is a matter of “[a]uslegungsmaxime, general rules of 
interpretation . . . [that] constitutional values contribute to a proper 
understanding of constitutional provisions.”151 In addition, there is a 
tendency for third world countries to copy constitutional structures, 
regardless of their particular circumstances, a tendency that has resulted in 
 146. MCCLELLAND, supra note 2, at 265. 
 147. ALEX CARROLL, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 40 (2d ed. 2002). 
 148. “Everyone agrees that there is no real rule of law in China . . . . But we have a great deal of 
difficulty explaining why.” Michael W. Dowdle, Heretical Laments: China and the Fallacies of “Rule 
of Law,” 11 CULTURAL DYNAMICS 287 (1999), at http://www.sagepub.co.uk/PDF/JOURNALS/ 
FULLTEXT/a010175.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2004). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Ricard A. Rosen, Constitutional Process, Constitutionalism, and the Eritrean Experience, 24 
N.C. J. INT’L. L. & COM. REG. 263, 274 (1999). 
 151. Hiroshi Nishihara, The Significance of Constitutional Values 2 (2001), at 
http://www.puk.ac.za/lawper/2001-1/nisiharadoc.doc (last visited Sept. 28, 2004). 
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the failure of several constitutions in the Third World.152 Culture-specific 
constitutions are a discernible trend in the countries created after the Cold 
War.153 For China, historical particularities that should be considered 
include its distinctive jurisprudence, which emanates from its ontological 
base in tradition. 
In China, rule by law (i.e. written law) dates back to its early dynastic 
history. Chinese historians attribute one of the earliest collections of laws, 
Criminal Law of Yu (Yu Xing), to the Xia Dynasty (Xia Chao) (2205–1806 
B.C.), the first dynasty described in Chinese historical records.154 The 
Shang Dynasty (Shang Chao) (1600–1046 B.C.), which followed the Xia 
Dynasty, referred to its collection as the “Tang Criminal Code” (Tang 
Xing).155 However, the first written systematic feudal code, Law and 
Scripture156 or The Book of Law,157 was authored by an early Legalist 
Likui (455–395 B.C.)158 during the Spring and Autumn Period (Chunqiu 
Shidai) (722–481 B.C.) and the Warring States Period (Zhanguo Shidai) 
(403–221 B.C.).159 To develop a feudal economy and protect the landlord 
class, Li Kui abolished the hereditary status of the old nobility and instead 
enforced measures rewarding and punishing each according to what he 
personally deserved.160 It was in this sense that Li Kui stressed nothing is 
more important to the reign of a king “than the prevention of robbers.”161 
The conception of rule with law reached its zenith during the Tang 
Dynasty (Tang Chao) (618–907 A.D.) in the writings, Commentary on 
Tang’s Law (Tang lv Shuyi) and Tang’s Six Canons (Liudian).162 The 
Commentary on Tang’s Law is hailed as “the earliest extant complete law 
code in China,” whereas, Tang’s Six Canons provided “the earliest extant 
perfect administrative law code.”163 These early writings evidence a 
 152. Rett R. Ludwikowski, Constitution Making in the Countries of Former Soviet Dominance: 
Current Development, 23 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 155, 158 (1993) (providing examples of 
constitution “transplants,” and their results). 
 153. John S. Dryzek, Constitutionalism and its Alternatives, (Prepared for presentation at the 
Social and Political Theory Program Workshop on “Democratic Theory: The Canberra Papers,” Mar. 
27, 2002), available at http://socopol.anu.edu.au/pdf-files/democracy_dryzek.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 
2004). 
 154. ZHAOWU, supra note 49, at 13. 
 155. Id. 
 156. JIANG, supra note 8, at 12–13 (quoting XIAN DAI MIN FA XUE (MODERN CIVIL LAW STUDY) 
42 (1995)). 
 157. ZHAOWU, supra note 49, at 73. 
 158. Id. 
 159. JIANG, supra note 8, at 12. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 13. 
 162. Id. at 11. 
 163. Id. at 12 (quoting ZHONGGUO ZHENGZHI SIXIANG SHI, SUI TANG SONG YUEN MING QING 
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Chinese consciousness about law and its place in Chinese society. These 
written laws caused distinctive Chinese perspectives about law to 
develop,164 and culminated in a body of philosophical literature known as 
traditional Chinese jurisprudence.165 
“Traditional Chinese jurisprudence . . . [is] extracted from the very 
large general philosophical literature representing various schools of 
traditional Chinese thought.166 Primary sources of traditional Chinese 
jurisprudence include the writings and legal philosophies of the 
Confucianists and the Legalists.167 While there were other schools of 
traditional Chinese philosophy, Confucianism and Legalism are the 
dominant legal philosophies.168 An on-going debate between 
Confucianism and Legalism is a discourse directed to the clash between 
rule by man (fa ren) and rule by law (fa li).169 Confucianism infuses law 
with moral qualities, while Legalism, as an antithesis, is a harbor for 
positive law (li).170  
“Traditional Chinese legal philosophy . . . begins with Confucius.”171 
The Analects of Confucius are the principle source of Confucianism.172 
The gist of Confucianism, the orthodoxy of the traditional Chinese state, is 
the notion that human society expresses itself through a finite number of 
hierarchical relationships.173 The type of relationship in question imposed 
certain duties on, and granted certain rights to, respective individuals in 
such relationships.174 These pre-determined relationships were reciprocal, 
if not mutual.175 That properly defined relationships result in desired 
behavior on the part of both the individual and society is the essence of 
Confucianism.176 
JUAN (HISTORY OF CHINESE POLITICS) (Sui, Tang, Song, Ming, Qing Periods) 59 (Liv Zehua ed. 
1996)). 
 164. Funk, supra note 116, at 2. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 2–4. 
 168. Id. Other philosophies include “the Taoists, Ying Yang school, Logicians, Chinese 
Buddhists, . . . the Sung dynasty (960–1279 AD), and Ming dynasty (1368–1644 A.D.), [and the] Neo-
Confucianists.” Id. at 4. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 7. 
 171. Id. at 13. 
 172. Xin Guanjie, Foreword to ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS 4 (Cai Xiqin, trans., 1994). 
 173. For a summary of Confucianism and its place in traditional Chinese jurisprudence, see Funk, 
supra note 116. 
 174. Id. at 7. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
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In contrast, Legalism embodies a radical reliance on centralized power 
and emphasizes Machiavellian principles for controlling and maximizing 
power.177 Legalism relies on harsh laws, at least initially, to promote 
correct behavior.178 Legalism became popular during the Spring and 
Autumn Period (Chunqiu Shidai) (722–481 B.C.) and the Warring States 
Period (Zhanguo Shidai) (403–221 B.C.), during which times the view 
was espoused that a monarch should rule according to law, as opposed to 
virtue.179 
Traditional Chinese philosophy, including the ethos of Confucianism, 
Daoism, and Legalism, continues to exert its influence and transform the 
practical realities of modern China. “Contemporary Chinese political 
figures are still influenced by those traditions, even though communist 
ideology plays an important role in shaping their worldview and guiding 
their revolutionary practice.”180 
B. China’s Ontological Base in Tradition 
It is difficult to discuss Chinese constitutionalism without considering 
the dynamics of culture. For China, culture flows from its ontological base 
in tradition, Confucianism.181 Confucian themes predominate all 
traditional schools of Chinese philosophical thought in that, while 
different in some respects, “the major Asian religions and philosophies . . . 
share similar concepts about the origins and purpose of power.”182 The 
persistence and preservation of Confucianism is a foundation for 
constitutional values that emanate from an ontological base in tradition.183 
The effects of Confucian values on Chinese law are undoubted and far 
reaching.184 However, the Analects of Confucius, the principle source of 
Confucianism, contains differing interpretations. Some identify 
Confucianism with statism,185 while others argue Confucianism is 
 177. Id. at 28; see also NICOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (Luigi Ricci trans., The New 
American Library of World Literature 1952) (1515). 
 178. Funk, supra note 116, at 28. 
 179. JIANG, supra note 8, at 12. 
 180. George Xuezhi Guo, Guanxi in Chinese Politics 1 (2000) (unpublished dissertation, 
University of Virginia), at http://millercenter.virginia.edu/pubs/dissertation_chapters/2001/ 
guo%20Chapter.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2004). 
 181. Funk, supra note 116, at 45–46. 
 182. PISTOR & WELLONS, supra note 117, at 33. 
 183. Id. 
 184. See, e.g., Teema Ruskola, Law, Sexual Morality, and Gender Equality in Qing and 
Communist China, 103 YALE L.J. 2531, 2564 (1994). 
 185. See, e.g., Randall Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency and the Limits of Law: 
Administrative Law Reform and Rule of Law in the People’s Republic of China, 19 BERKELEY J. INT’L 
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compatible with, and perhaps enhances, Western notions of human 
rights.186 
In China, rational institutions (governmental organizations representing 
the public interest) are associated with Confucianism.187 The term 
“institution,” unlike in the West, enjoys an intrinsic Confucian value. In 
the West, “any established practice, law, or custom, etc., which is a 
material and persistent element in the life and culture of an organized 
social group,” is considered to be an institution.188 However, the Chinese 
equivalent to the term institution, chih-tu, is not as “broad or ‘value-free’” 
as its English counterpart.189 Chih-tu refers only to an “institution” that is 
“desirable and possesses an intrinsic value, the English equivalent would 
be a more elevated and value-laden ‘rational institution.’”190 Chinese 
institutions that are created to serve the public interest possess this moral 
characteristic.191 China’s ontological base in tradition and its Confucian 
values predict these foundational morals for institutions. As a result, 
institutions, such as the polity, socio-economics, and law, reflect 
Confucian values.192 From the consideration of personal relationships 
(guanxi) to the inner workings of China’s polity, in modern China, 
Confucianism as a vestige of antiquity is persistent and systemic.193 
Indeed, the CCP has used the nomenclature of Asian values to defend its 
giving priority to socio-economic rights over civil-political rights.194 
A problem with Confucianism in this context is that it is often 
employed for non-Confucian ends. The CCP introduced the world to a 
L. 161 (2001). 
 186. See, e.g., WM. THEODORE DE BARY, ASIAN VALUES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CONFUCIAN 
COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE (1999). 
 187. Ch’ien, supra note 115, at 121. 
‘[R]ational institutions’ flourished during the Western Han period (206 B.C.–A.D. 8), while 
most of the political systems in the Eastern Han times (A.D. 25–220) were motivated by the 
self-interest of Emperor Kuang-wu (r. 25–57). The T’ang dynasty (618–907) was 
commendable in that a number of ‘rational institutions’ were established. The succeeding 
Sung dynasty (907–1279), however, was quite content to rule by ‘maneuvers’ of various 
types; and the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) was even worst, many of her political systems can 
only be regarded as expedient operations, lacking the intrinsic value of ‘rational institutions.’ 
The Ch’ing dynasty (1644–1911) was the worst. 
Id. at 121–22. 
 188. Id. at 121. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. DE BARY, supra note 186. 
 193. See Guo, supra note 180, at 1. 
 194. See Xiaorong Li, A Question of Priorities: Human Rights, Development, and “Asian 
Values,” 18 PHIL. & PUB. POL’Y 7 (1998). 
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variant of traditional Asian political rhetoric195 by characterizing its 
priorities as a matter of traditional Asian values.196 Social stability is a pre-
eminent concern of the CCP, and because, according to them, nation-states 
have differing levels of stability,197 there cannot be a universal standard of 
human rights applicable to all nation-states.198 Within this context, 
economic reform is first and foremost; it is more important than the rights 
of individual citizens.199 
Nonetheless, it is difficult to deny that Confucianism is persistent in 
modern China, especially in terms of a distinctive Chinese ontology or 
ontological base in tradition.  
Foucault calls it “history of the present” . . . in some others 
“ontology of the present” . . . or even “critical ontology of 
ourselves” . . . . On the other hand, this kind of critical 
understanding does not bear a merely theoretical interest, it also 
carries within itself practical concerns: through the understanding of 
the limitation of the present epoch, it paves the way to getting out of 
its impasse and helps to search for new possibilities for the 
development of humanity. Foucault even says that critique 
understood in this sense is the critical attitude itself: “it has to be 
conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the 
critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical 
analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with 
the possibility of going beyond them.”200 
Confucianism, tradition, and Asian values in general constitute China’s 
“history of the present.” It is through China’s distinctive ontological base 
in tradition that it will potentially make progress in the area of political 
and economic development, and in the areas of constitutionalism, rule of 
law, and judicial review. 
Confucianism and Asian values serve as harbingers of foundational or 
societal values, encompassing the forces, if not the values, of China’s 
 195. See Seth R. Harris, Asian Human Rights: Forming a Regional Covenant, ASIAN-PAC. & 
POL’Y J. 17:10 (2000), available at http://www.hawaii.edu/aplpj/pdfs/17-seth.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 
2004). 
 196. See Xiaorang, supra note 194, at 7. 
 197. See Harris, supra note 195, at 13–14.  
 198. See id. 
 199. See Tay, supra note 94, § 1(2). 
 200. Kwok-ying Lau, Jan Patočka: Critical Consciousness and Non-Euro-Centric Philosopher of 
the Phenomenological Movement, 9–10 (2002), available at http://www.o-p-o.net/essays/ 
LauArticle.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2004) (quoting Michael Foulault, Quést-ce que les Lumiéres? 
[What is Enlightenment] (1978), reprinted in THE FOUCAULT READER 50 (Paul Rabinow ed., 1984)). 
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political, socio-economic, and legal institutions. These foundational values 
will likewise translate into a genuine indigenous ethos for Chinese 
constitutionalism.  
V. CHINA’S MARBURY VS. MADISON 
A. Chinese Judicial Independence 
Zui gao renmin fayuan guanyu yi qinfan xingming quan de shouduan 
qinfan xianfa baohu de gongmin shou jiaoyu de jiben quanli shi fou ying 
chengdan minshi zeren de pifu (The Official Reply of the Supreme 
People’s Court On Whether the Civil Liabilities Shall Be Borne for the 
Infringement Upon a Citizens Basic Right of Receiving Education Which 
is Under the Protection of the Constitution by Means of Infringing Upon 
His/Her Right of Personal Name), was adopted by the Judicial Committee 
of the Supreme People’s Court on June 28, 2001. It was issued on July 24, 
2001 and came into effect on August 13, 2001 (the “Reply”).201 The 
Supreme People’s Court’s Reply included this language: 
Through investigation of the facts in this case, We are of the 
opinion that Chen Xiaoqi and the others have by means of 
infringing upon the right of personal name infringed upon Qi 
Yuling’s basic right of receiving education, which shall be enjoyed 
by her in accordance with the Constitution, and have caused specific 
losses, therefore, they shall bear the corresponding civil 
liabilities.202 
Huang Songyou, Chief Judge of the First Civil Division of the Supreme 
People’s Court, hailed the Reply as tantamount to Western style of judicial 
review akin to Western notions of constitutionalism and justiciability.203  
Judge Huang argued that the Reply establishes a precedent for the 
justiciability of the Constitution because, like other laws and regulations, 
the Constitution may now be the subject of judicial proceedings, and may 
serve as a legal basis for judgment.204 Judge Huang sees far-reaching 
implications arising from this Reply. First, the Reply establishes a 
 201. Official Reply of the Supreme People’s Court on Whether the Civil Liabilities Shall Be Borne 
For the Infringement upon a Citizen’s Basic Right of Receiving Education, July 24, 2001, available at 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/dispecontent.asp?ID=1954&DB=1 [hereinafter July 24, 2001 Reply]. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Songyou Huang (Chief Judge of the First Civil Division of the Supreme People’s Court), 
Making the Constitution Justiciable and its Significance, PEOPLE’S COURT DAILY, Aug. 13, 2001. 
 204. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss1/3
p 43 Killion book pages.doc2/18/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] CHINA’S AMENDED CONSTITUTION 69 
 
 
 
 
 
 
precedent for courts to use to protect the fundamental rights of citizens.205 
It is in this distinction that Judge Huang argues that the Reply constitutes a 
landmark decision in the Chinese legal system.206 The fundamental rights 
of citizens, if so stipulated in the Constitution, are now protected, 
irrespective of a conversion of such rights under ordinary legal norms.207 
Second, Judge Huang argues that the Reply implicitly creates a precedent 
for justiciability of the Constitution.208 Third, the Court uses civil law 
remedies, rather than criminal or administrative law remedies to redress 
violations of fundamental rights.209 
B. Progeny of China’s Marbury vs. Madison 
Contrary to the contentions of Judge Huang, these cases are rare, 
typically involve disputes of nominal societal interests, and rarely 
challenge the government’s actions. A litmus test of independent judicial 
review is whether there is judicial activism or judicial interpretations that 
call for social engineering.210 Given the prevailing structures of democratic 
centralism and socialist democracy, when the CCP makes a policy 
decision for China, “the NPC is unable to block implementation of its 
decision, even if the decision proves to be a wrong one.”211 Thus, the NPC 
does not have the power to challenge either the CCP’s legislative or 
administrative decisions.212 
The situation is further exacerbated by the lack of popular sovereignty 
in China. Chinese citizens do not elect candidates to the NPC or 
SCNPC.213 Consequently, NPC Deputies and SCNPC committee members 
retain their legislative seats without challenge from the people.214 Deputies 
to the NPC are indirectly elected.215 Contrary to Western notions of 
sovereignty, the power to elect and remove deputies is retained by the 
CCP. 
The prospect that China’s constitution will evolve toward a more 
independent judiciary is tenuous for additional reasons. The 1982 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 847 (6th ed. 1990). 
 211. JIANG, supra note 8, 559. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 559–60. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
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Constitution prohibits an expansion of the judiciary’s powers of review.216 
The Supreme People’s Court has a power of judicial interpretation (sifa 
jieshi quanli), but it is limited to interpreting Chinese laws and regulations 
arising in actual cases.217 This is not the same power as that 
constitutionally vested with the SCNPC to interpret the Constitution and 
laws of China (lifa jieshi quanli).218 This alignment of governmental 
power grants the NPC and SCNPC greater power over the Supreme 
People’s Court. Article 127 of the 1982 Constitution provides, “The 
Supreme People’s Court is responsible to the National People’s Congress 
and its Standing Committee.”219 Expanding Chinese courts’ power of 
judicial review to include the power to interpret the Constitution and laws 
of China (lifa jieshi quanli) directly contravenes articles 67(1) and 67(4) of 
the 1982 Constitution, which constitutionally vest that power in the 
SCNPC.220 Moreover, the NPC, the highest organ of state power, acts 
through its standing committee, the SCNPC.221 Both the NPC and SCNPC 
exercise the state’s legislative power.222 Given that the Supreme People’s 
Court is responsible to both the NPC and SCNPC, an expansion of the 
judicial review powers of China’s judiciary is improbable, perhaps 
unconstitutional.223 Granting the judiciary that power would disrupt the 
fundamental structure of China’s present government, which clearly 
promotes the supremacy of the legislature, if not of the CCP itself. Indeed, 
“[d]isruption of the socialist system by any organization or individual is 
prohibited.”224 This alignment of constitutional powers is further 
sanctioned by the People’s Republic of China Legislation Law (Lifa Fa), 
which reaffirmed the legal hierarchy of the constitution, laws, 
administrative regulations, and orders, at both national and local levels.225 
Further complicating the situation is the conflict of constitutional ethos, 
or values, that emanate from the respective philosophies of the East 
(Confucianism) and West (Enlightenment). Despite a persistent, though 
one-sided, flow of cultural influences from West to Sinic, such irredentism 
inevitably confronts a systemic ontological base in traditional 
 216. 1982 CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, art. 67. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. arts. 67(1), 67(4). 
 219. Id. art. 128. 
 220. Id. arts. 67(1), 67(4). 
 221. Id. art. 57. 
 222. Id. art. 58. 
 223. Id. art. 128. 
 224. Id. art. 1. 
 225. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo lifa fa (The Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of 
China), President of the People’s Republic of China, Mar. 15, 2000 [hereinafter Legislation Law]. 
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Confucianism. Thus, it becomes difficult to envision China’s polity 
adopting a constitutional regime reflective of Western ethos, in particular 
the notion of negative liberty. The Western notion of safeguarding liberty 
stems from the philosophies of the Enlightenment thinkers, from which the 
principles of separation of powers, popular sovereignty, and independent 
judicial review emanate.226 Moreover, the latter Western philosophies are 
responsible for the development of the legal concept of natural law that 
serves as a rationale for a number of U.S. Supreme Court decisions, such 
as Lochner vs. New York227 and Griswold vs. Connecticut.228 
Neither the U.S. Constitution nor China’s 1982 Constitution explicitly 
provide for independent judicial review. However, it was not the written 
document itself that served as the foundation from which independent 
judicial review evolved. There is a difference between a constitution as a 
written document, and the principles of constitutionalism.229 As previously 
mentioned, it is a matter of “auslegungsmaxime, [the] general rules of 
interpretation [or] constitutional values [that] contribute to [a] proper 
understanding of constitutional provisions.”230 In the West, and especially 
in the United States, the legal concept of natural law served as the pivotal 
force in the evolution of judicial review, from the Dr. Bonham’s Case to 
Marbury vs. Madison. Natural rights, along with other forces, further 
developed the concepts of separation of powers and popular sovereignty. It 
is for these reasons that the concepts of the separation of powers, popular 
sovereignty, and independent judicial review are requisite to any 
constitutional structure that safeguards negative liberty. 
Defining liberty in terms of socialist democracy presents an obstacle to 
negative liberty and to China’s relative constitutionalism. Chinese 
constitutionalism is best described as protecting social rights, rather than 
liberty.231 Indeed, assuming there is a liberty interest in Chinese 
constitutionalism, it is a positive rather than a negative liberty.232 These 
differing perceptions of liberty reflect the cultural divergences between the 
Sinic and West. China and its foundational values (Confucianism) oppose 
the adoption of a Western variety of liberty focused on the individual. 
Given the persistent and systemic ontological base in tradition 
(Confucianism), as recognized in both China at the turn of the nineteenth 
 226. See supra notes 124–45 and accompanying text. 
 227. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905). 
 228. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
 229. ANDRÁS SAJÓ, LIMITING GOVERNMENT 2, 9–16 (1999). 
 230. Nishihara, supra note 151, at 2. 
 231. See supra Part IV. 
 232. Id. 
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century and in modern China, the continuing reality may well be that the 
general population still regards the monarchy to be a part of the “natural 
political order.”233 Furthermore, as previously mentioned, Chinese society 
was still suffused with hierarchical relationships and patriarchal values 
where authority was traditionally vested in the state not the people.234 
Finally, there is the issue of social rights. Contrary to Judge Huang’s 
enunciation of a more justiciable 1982 Constitution, the July 24, 2001 
Reply is the constitutionalization of social rights, rather than individual 
liberty. Moreover, and most important, the July 24, 2001 Reply is not an 
express or implied grant of the power of constitutional review.235 
China’s democratic centralism and socialist democracy lack separation 
of powers and constitutional review. This absence challenges the 
enforceability and effectiveness of constitutional provisions, such as the 
2004 Amendments, which supposedly address liberty, human rights, and 
property rights. Unlike Western constitutions, China’s constitutional 
provisions do not necessarily vest Chinese citizens with a cognizable legal 
right of action. In order for a provision in the 1982 Constitution to be 
enforceable in a court of law, the provision must first be reduced to an 
ordinary legal norm through the judicial process of converting 
fundamental rights into ordinary laws and regulations.236 Only then does a 
person’s cognizable legal right vest.237 A problem with Chinese legal 
norms is that, given China’s governmental structure and the de facto 
power held by the CCP, safeguarding liberty becomes an issue of 
safeguarding social rights. And the justiciability of social rights provisions 
in the 1982 Constitution become, ultimately, contingent upon China’s 
CCP, rather than the judiciary. 
VI. ECONOMIC AND NON-ECONOMIC LIBERTY 
A. Economic Equality Norms and Judicial Review 
The growth and evolution of Chinese constitutionalism and, in 
particular, judicial review is contingent on several forces, ranging from the 
CCP’s institutions to China’s reform obligations. These factors encompass 
 233. Sullivan, supra note 52, at 21. 
 234. Id. 
 235. See Songyou, supra note 203; July 24, 2001 Reply, supra note 201. 
 236. See Songyou, supra note 203; July 24, 2001 Reply, supra note 201. 
 237. Songyou, supra note 203. 
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both domestic needs and obligations set forth in the Protocol on Accession 
to the WTO.238  
Given China’s ontological base in traditional Confucianism, the 
Protocol on Accession is as an important external force compelling both a 
further evolution of judicial review and a directional path for development. 
For China, the Protocol on Accession, an obligation of WTO 
membership,239 requires broad systemic reforms in the areas of 
transparency (toumingdu),240 independent judicial review (duli sifa 
shencha),241 and fairness (gongping).242  
However, there are problems with WTO rules serving as an external 
force for independent judicial review. First, China’s constitutional values 
are genuinely indigenous and emanate from China’s ontological base in 
tradition (Confucianism). Second, the WTO is an international 
organization dominated by developed countries and economies, rather than 
by developing countries and economies, such as China. This problem is 
demonstrated by the recent failure of the September 2003 Ministerial 
Conference due to a division between developed and developing 
countries.243 Third, WTO rules prescribing judicial review are in dire need 
of reform. Currently, the rules only require “judicial review,” a notion that 
may include traditional judicial review rather than independent judicial 
review.244 
Nonetheless, Chinese constitutionalism must evolve into either a more 
discursive model of independent judicial review or an alternative model of 
constitutional review. Legal reforms are needed to sustain economic 
growth and prosperity. The CCP, the Asian Development Bank,245 and 
other international bodies, such as the WTO,246 recognize this need to 
establish sound legal mechanisms. 
 238. See generally Protocol on Accession, supra note 25. 
 239. WTO Agreement, supra note 25. 
 240. Protocol on Accession, supra note 25, art. 2(c). 
 241. Id. art. 2(d); see also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. 13, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 
A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-
adp.doc (last visited Sept. 28, 2004). 
 242. Protocol on Accession, supra note 25, arts. 6, 16. 
 243. WTO News, Summary of September 14, 2003, Day 4: Conference Ends Without Consensus, 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minis_e/min03_14sept_e.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 
2004). 
 244. Protocol on Accession, supra note 25, arts. 2(A)3, 2(D). 
 245. ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK PUBLICATION 1–4 (1999), 
available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Others/Law_ADB/1&d_1999.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 
2004). 
 246. Wang Baoshu, China’s Accession to the WTO and the Building of a Socialist Market 
Economic Legal System, in CHINA: ACCESSION TO THE WTO AND ECONOMIC REFORM, 338 (Wang 
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China’s model of judicial review and its evolutionary path will affect 
both the economic and the non-economic sectors of China, and its effects 
will extend to the global economy and to issues of international law and 
politics. In terms of globalization, on-going Chinese legal reform will 
affect, albeit indirectly, issues of international trade and finance, 
encompassing competitive policy and laws, intellectual property, issues of 
anti-dumping and anti-subsidies, and other trade-related issues. 
In terms of judicial review and international trade, the WTO rules 
achieved a small measure of success following the Supreme People’s 
Court’s December 2002 announcement concerning provisions for the 
handling of administrative decisions involving anti-dumping and anti-
subsidy disputes.247 These provisions address issues of production of 
evidence,248 burden of proof,249 jurisdiction,250 and other procedural 
safeguards.251 In conjunction with article 53 of China’s Anti-Dumping 
Regulation252 and article 52 of China’s Anti-Subsidy Regulation,253 the 
Supreme People’s Court rules propose to provide foreign exporters with a 
right of judicial review. However, the efficacy of these provisions, while 
in compliance with WTO standards, is nonetheless contingent on the CCP, 
trade and regional administration, departmental interests, and local 
protectionism, rather than China’s constitution, rule of law, and judicial 
review.254 
Mengku ed., 2002). China’s major legislative goals are expressed threefold: “Continuing to revise laws 
that are not in conformity with China’s obligations under the WTO rules; revising laws that are not 
conducive to enhancing the competitive power of Chinese enterprises in the international market; and 
improving laws offering protection to domestic enterprises and ensuring industrial safety.” Id. For 
China, “a well-established socialist market legal system is naturally part of a well-established socialist 
market economic system.” Id. 
 247. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zuigao renmin fayuan gonggao (Zui Gao Renmin Fayuan 
Guanyu Chengli Fanqingxiao Xingzheng Anjian Yingyong Falv Ruogan Wenti De Guiding) 
[Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Anti-
Dumping Administrative Cases], The Supreme People’s Court, Nov. 2, 2002, 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/dispecontent.asp?ID=2559&DB=1 (last visited Sept. 7, 2004). 
 248. Id. arts. 8, 9. 
 249. Id. art. 7. 
 250. Id. art. 5. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fanqingxiao tiaoli [Anti-Dumping Regulation of the People’s 
Republic of China], State Council of China, Nov. 26, 2001, art. 53, http://www.lawinfochina.com/ 
dispecontent.asp?ID=2121&DB=1 (last visited Sept. 7, 2004) (2001) 
 253. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fabutie tiaoli [Countervailing Regulation of the People’s 
Republic of China], State Council of China, Nov. 26, 2001, art. 52, http://www.lawinfochina.com/ 
dispecontent.asp?ID=2124&DB=1 (last visited Sept. 7, 2004). 
 254. Wang, supra note 246, at 381. 
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The problem with the Chinese judiciary’s ability to safeguard liberty 
and the norms of “economic equality” prescribed by WTO standards255 
arises from the fact that liberty in terms of Western constitutionalism 
constitutes negative liberty, as opposed to positive liberty. Thus, 
independent judicial review addresses issues of substantive due process, 
rather than procedural due process. Substantive due process constitutes 
individual liberty, and, most important, poses a threat to the CCP, because 
it address both the government’s power and the protection of fundamental 
rights,256 as opposed to the procedural due process safeguard of a right to 
be heard.257  
B. Liberty and Independent Judicial Review 
In terms of both economic and non-economic issues, the effectiveness 
of China’s model of judicial review will always be contingent on the 
Chinese political system, rather than its constitution, rule of law, or system 
of judicial review. A problem for Chinese constitutionalism is the de facto 
power of the CCP. Since 1949, the CCP has prevailed in all confrontations 
within the ambit of its political, legal, and constitutional authority. A case 
in point is Hong Kong’s right of abode case, Ng Siu Tung v. Director of 
Immigrations.258 The Court of Final Appeal of Hong Kong attempted to 
exercise an assumed power of independent judicial review, but afterwards, 
on June 26th, 1999, it had to yield to the superior authority of the 
SCNPC.259 The CCP will always prevail in such confrontations because of 
the realities of Chinese constitutionalism. 
In the non-economic sector of China, one can occasionally witness the 
successful pleading of rights in a court of law based upon supposed 
 255. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT & WTO—INSIGHTS ON TREATY LAW 
AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 57–58 (2002). The non-discrimination norm of most-favoured-nations 
treatment requires a country “to give equal treatment to economic transactions originating in, or 
destined for, other countries entitled to the benefit of the norm.” Id. at 57 (emphasis in original). 
 256. See Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971). 
 257. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972). Procedural due process entails “an opportunity to 
be heard ‘. . . at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Id. (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 
380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). 
 258. Ng Siu Tung v. Director of Immigrations, Court of Final Appeal of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region, FACV Nos. 1–3 of 2001 (2002), http://www.hklii.org/hk/eng_jud/HKCFA/ 
2002/20020110_FACV000001_2001.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2004). 
 259. The Interpretation by the SCNPC of Articles 22(4) and 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law of the Hong 
Kong S.A.R. of the People’s Republic of China, The Standing Committee of the Ninth National 
People’s Congress at its Tenth Session (June 26, 1999), available at http://citizensparty.org/ 
laws/scnpc.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2004). 
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constitutional norms, as evidenced by Judge Huang’s article260 and the 
July 24th, 2001 Reply.261 However, it is equally true that there are cases 
that shock the conscience of justice. An illustrative and recent case is what 
is being referred to as the BMW case.262  
On October 16th, 2003, Su Xiuwen, while driving a new BMW, killed 
Liu Zhongxia, in Harbin, Heilongjiang Province, China.263 Prior to the 
accident, 
Su admitted cursing Dai and hitting him with her purse after his 
tractor scraped her BMW. She said she was upset by the accident 
and thought the car was in reverse when it sped into the crowd. She 
also said she had learned to drive only recently and could not find 
the brakes.264 
Dai Yiquan, 46, the widower of the deceased Liu Zhongxie, is a poor 
farmer.265 
Following the case, many people were suspicious: 
Newspaper reports noted that police never opened a manslaughter 
investigation, that no witnesses were called to testify in Su’s trial 
and that statements taken from them were not read in court. Police 
would not say whether technicians examined Su’s car or whether 
investigators tried to verify her claims of limited driving 
experience.266 
The BMW, which struck Liu Zhongxia and caused her death, also injured 
several bystanders before crashing into a tree.267 On December 20, 2003, a 
local court in Heilongjiang Province, after ruling the case a “traffic 
disturbance,” sentenced Su to a suspended sentence.268 
The decision in the BMW case displays many of the problems of the 
Chinese legal system. First, the case represents the divide between the rich 
and the poor in China. Su Xiuwen was married to Guan Mingbo, a wealthy 
businessman;269 meanwhile, Dai Yiquan and his deceased wife, Liu 
 260. Songyou, supra note 203. 
 261. July 24, 2001 Reply, supra note 201. 
 262. Philip P. Pan, The Unquiet Death of a Chinese Peasant—Lenient Treatment for Driver in 
‘BMW Case’ Ignites Media Frenzy, Wide Discussion of Wealth and Justice, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 
2004, at A14. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
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Zhongxia, were part of the poor strata of Chinese society. Second, the 
public was under the impression that little, if any, investigation was 
undertaken in what should have been, at a minimum, a case of 
manslaughter.270 Third, assuming the guilt of Su, the resulting verdict of a 
suspended sentence shocks the conscience of justice.271 
However, and most important, the case of Su Xiuwen speaks to a 
problem of justice, be it civil or criminal, in Chinese society, especially in 
terms of independent judicial review. Yang Xiaohuai, a defense lawyer in 
Beijing, said the “basic problem was the lack of an independent judiciary, 
which undermines trust in the legal system. ‘In China, there is a 
phenomenon,’ he said. ‘Power is greater than the law, money is greater 
than the law and connections are greater than the law.’”272 
Moreover, the growing public distrust resulting from the BMW Case, as 
evidenced by the flooding of the internet by Chinese citizens over this 
case, speaks to an issue of not only independent judicial review, but also 
the need for popular sovereignty.273 
The BMW Case may also, eventually, demonstrate the de facto power 
of China’s polity in that, in response to public outcry over the verdict, 
party officials ordered an investigation into the handling of the case.274 
While this may lead to a just result in this particular case, it does little for 
the development of independent judicial review. Indeed, there is a growing 
fear that the CCP will increasingly interfere with the disposition of judicial 
cases, much to the dismay of those who favor independent judicial 
review.275 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In China, there is an inherent danger of a flexible constitutional 
amendment process that allows for the frequent constitutionalization of 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. 
[In December 2003], China’s highest court ordered the execution of an alleged gangster after 
a similar outcry on the Internet against a decision to grant him a reprieve based on evidence 
he had confessed under torture. Several months earlier, outrage on the Internet over the death 
of a college student in police custody led the party to abolish a regulation allowing police to 
detain people without proper identification. 
Id. 
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political ideology.276 Because the 1982 Constitution manifests a history of 
constitutionalizing official party ideology,277 China runs the risk of 
becoming victim to political and ideological forces as ideology supplants 
the 1982 Constitution, the 1982 Constitution emerges as no more than an 
affirmation of official party ideology and a demand for conformity to it.278 
In terms of Chinese constitutionalism, past and present constitutions 
have constitutionalized a host of CCP ideologies. The amendments 
“incorporate the theory of ‘Three Represents’ into the Constitution’s 
preamble as one of the guiding principles of the nation, together with the 
heritage and further development of Marxism, Leninism, Mao Zedong 
Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory.”279 The combination of these 
constitutionalized ideologies speaks to the survival of the CCP, democratic 
centralism, and social democracy. Because reforms have so profoundly 
changed Chinese society, traditional Marxist-Leninist institutions are 
increasingly becoming “less effective tools for building popular legitimacy 
or managing society.”280 In its search for political legitimacy, the CCP 
must formulate new forms of political legitimacy,281 as it arguably 
intended to do when it constitutionally enshrined the “Three Represents” 
and other official party ideologies.282 
Until China’s polity incorporates a more Western model of 
constitutionalism with separation of powers, popular sovereignty, and 
independent judicial review, amendments to the 1982 Constitution that 
supposedly safeguard liberty and social rights will remain without effect. 
The advent of independent judicial review or some other form of 
constitutional review may safeguard liberty and social rights; in the 
absence of independent judicial review, neither liberty nor social rights 
will be protected. Constitutionalism that could have evolved into a 
normative form but for the vesting of de facto power in the CCP, evolved 
into a semantic constitutionalism that fails to safeguard liberty or social 
rights. 
The need for independent judicial review is imperative, especially in 
terms of safeguarding liberty and economic and non-economic rights.283 
As for the future prospects of China’s polity adopting a more modern 
 276. KILI, supra note 12, at 131. 
 277. See supra Part II.B. 
 278. KILI, supra note 12, at 131–32. 
 279. Human Rights, Private Property Fixed as Pillars, supra note 14 (emphasis added). 
 280. McCormick, supra note 75, at 153. 
 281. Wong, supra note 27. 
 282. Human Rights, Private Property Fixed as Pillars, supra note 14. 
 283. See generally PISTOR & WELLONS, supra note 117, at 272–78. 
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variation of Western constitutionalism, rule of law, and judicial review, 
one can only speculate. However, there is a glimmer of hope offered in 
traditional Chinese jurisprudence. Given the natural evolution of legal 
systems,284 and acceleration of legal reform caused by accession to the 
WTO,285 there is a hope for an evolution of a Chinese constitutionalism,  
rule of law, and an independent judicial review that resembles Western 
jurisprudence to a greater degree. However, it is unreasonable to suspect 
that such an evolution will exactly replicate Western jurisprudence due to 
China’s distinctive ontological base in tradition. Perhaps the resulting 
evolution will reflect vestiges of traditional Chinese jurisprudence in a 
mixture of Chinese and Western jurisprudence, though it may embody a 
distinctive modern Chinese jurisprudence that would reflect China’s 
ontological base in tradition. 
The gist of the problem will always be found in the foundational values 
representative of China’s ontological base in tradition, because, in terms of 
Sinic-West relations, “the problem of China, however multifarious and 
complicated it may seem at first sight is in reality one of cultural conflict 
and readjustment.”286 However, Confucianism may offer a possible 
solution to the impasse of cultural conflict. Wm. Theodore De Bary, in a 
discourse concerning Asian values and human rights, controversially 
argues that while the Confucian sense of the individual differs from the 
Western libertarian concept of the individual, Confucianism is not 
incompatible with Western notions of human rights. Rather, it enhances 
human rights287 and, in this respect, Rousseau’s version of liberty presents 
a savior.288 In terms of China, “what is amiss in the argument is any 
consideration of the community as a form of infrastructure that might 
mediate between individuals and the state, and perform the function of a 
civil society in protecting the interests of either the individual or people in 
groups (rather than en masse).”289 By analogy, the “consensual, 
voluntaristic character of the Confucian ritual ideals,”290 resolves the 
dilemma of positive liberty versus negative liberty.291 “Liberty becomes 
something we do, not something I do.”292 Confucian values are, hence, 
 284. Harold J. Berman, The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale, 103 YALE 
L. J. 1651, 1654–55 (1994). 
 285. Wang, supra note 246, at 332–37. 
 286. SHI, supra note 93, at 34. 
 287. See generally DE BARY, supra note 186. 
 288. See generally ROUSSEAU, supra note 138. 
 289. DE BARY, supra note 186, at 155. 
 290. Id. 
 291. MCCLELLAND, supra note 2, at 265. 
 292. Id. 
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potentially reconcilable with Western universalism.293 
Although tradition fell into disfavor by those seeking to Westernize and 
modernize China at the turn of the nineteenth century, and particularly 
during the May Fourth Movement,294 Confucianism, now, contrarily offers 
hope for a more Western-oriented model of constitutionalism, rule of law, 
and independent judicial review. It is a hope bolstered by the rebirth of 
traditional Confucian values in modern China, a rebirth that is sanctioned, 
if not promoted, by China’s polity, albeit for non-Confucianism ends.295 
Assuming Confucianism can, or does, foster universal values and 
norms, the discovery of corresponding universal values resembling 
Western ethos may result in Confucianism’s rebirth. This rebirth would 
represent a new Chinese Renaissance (Zhongguo De Wenyi Fuxing),296 
paralleling the Western Renaissance (Rinascimento) of the sixteenth 
century that marked a turning point for Western civilization.297 In 
seventeenth century China, history witnessed a similar process. “In the 
pivotal moment of transition from Ming to Qing there emerged a new 
intellectual awakening of humanity and humanism, and in the sphere of 
political thought it manifested itself in the formation of democratic ideas 
with a distinctive modern hue.”298 Moreover, a historical basis exists for 
democracy in China, traceable to a history in traditional Chinese 
government and traditional Chinese political theory.299  
In this respect, there is hope for an evolution toward a more discursive 
model of judicial review, if not a more Western-oriented model of 
Constitutionalism, rule of law, and judicial review. Although Chinese 
ziyou (liberty) might best be described as “something we do,” one would 
expect that for the Chinese citizenry, Chinese ziyou will, eventually, 
evolve into something I do, rather than something we do. 
 293. DE BARY, supra note 186, at 155. 
 294. See generally Schwarcz, supra note 51. 
 295. MICHAEL NYLAN, THE FIVE CONFUCIAN CLASSICS n.327-1 (1st entry online notes), at 
http://www.yalepress.yale.edu/YUPBooks/pdf/nylan7notes.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2004) (citations 
omitted). “Post-World War II dictators in both South Korea and Vietnam also tried to induce 
compliance with central government decrees by exploiting traditional respect for Confucian values. 
Like Chiang, they reduced Confucian teachings to mere slogans intended to serve highly un-Confucian 
ends.” Id. 
 296. SHI, supra note 93, at 295–314 (discussing early Chinese Renaissance). 
 297. See PAUL JOHNSON, THE RENAISSANCE: A SHORT HISTORY 3–4 (2000). 
 298. ZHAOWU, supra note 49, at 550. 
 299. SHI, supra note 93, at 295–314; CHÍEN, supra note 115, at 125. 
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